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DualDrillingCo. v. Mills EquipmentInvestments, Inc.-A
Statement About Conversion or a Statement About the

Concept of Fault?

I.

INTRODUCTION

The common law tort of conversion provides a means of protecting one's
possessory and ownership interest in chattels.' Conversion is an intentional tort,
but the requisite intent need not include a desire to harm the plaintiff's possessory

or ownership interest?2 The intent required is merely a volition to exercise control
over a chattel which is infact contrary to another's possessory or ownership
interest. Accordingly, a reasonable mistake by the defendant will not serve as a
defense since error as to fact or law does not negate the requisite intent.3 This
characteristic has lead some scholars to classify common law conversion as a strict
4
liability tort since neither conscious wrongdoing nor negligence is necessary.

In Dual Drilling Co. v. Mills Equipment Investments, Inc..' the Louisiana
Supreme Court jettisoned the common law tort of conversion from Louisiana.

Since 1886 the Louisiana courts have recognized the common law tort of
conversion as a theory of recovery." However, according to the court, what exists
Copyright 2000, by LouiSIANA LAW REvIEw.
I. Restatement (Second) of Torts §222A (1965).
2. Restatement (Second) of Toils §224 (1965).
3. Id.
4. A useful distinction may be made between strict liability and absolute liability. In both
absolute liability and strict liability personal knowledge ofan existing risk is irrelevant. However, strict
liability, like negligence, incorporates a risk/utility balance since there must be an unreasonable risk of
harm created either by the actor or something in his custody. In contrast, absolute liability does not
involve a risk/utility balance. When absolute liability is imposed, it is of no consequence that the
activity might present a reasonable risk of harm; the defendant is liable if there is damage. See Thomas
C. Galligan, Jr.. Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned Hand Formula, 52 La. L Rev. 323,
324-30,335-38 (1991). See generallyFrank L. Maraist &Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law
§§1-8, 1-9 (1996 & Supp. 1999) [hereinafter Louisiana Tort Law].
Based on the above distinction, the common law tort of conversion may be considered an
absolute liability offense since it does not require that an unreasonable risk of harm exist. Additionally,
the minimal requisite level of intent (intent to merely do the act) effectively negates any defense of
mistake. See Robert L Morris, Movable Property-Remedies ofOne Out ofPossession ofMovables,
37 Tul. L Rev. 843,845 (1963); A.N. Yiannopoulos. RealActlons inLouisiana and Comparative Law,
25 La. L Rev. 589, 692, 694 (1965); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property §346 at 673, in 2 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1999). Nevertheless courts and commentators often describe
conversion as a strict liability offense. Indeed the Dual Drilling court seems to use the terms strict
liability and absolute liability interchangeably. When the court uses the term strict liability in
describing common law conversion, it should be understood as absolute liability. However, this article
will use the term strict liability in place ofabsolute liability to avoid confusion.
5. 721 So. 2d 853 (La. 1998)
6. See Chamberlain v. Worrell, 38 La. Ann. 347 (1886). For notable cases in which Louisiana
courts have applied common law conversion principles see generally: Quealy v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 475 So. 2d 756 (La. 1985); Importsales, Inc. v. iUndeman, 92 So. 2d 574 (La.
1957); Uncecum v. Smith. 287 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), writ refused, 290 So. 2d 904 (La.
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in Louisiana is not the common law tort of conversion but a delictual action based
on Article 2315. The chief distinction between the delictual action and the
common law tort is that the former requires a showing of fault while the latter does
not. The court suggests that the strict liability characteristic of common law
conversion renders the tort incompatible with the Article 2315 requirement of fault.
Additionally, the court describes the common law tort as unnecessary in Louisiana
since movables are adequately protected under existing civilian remedies such as
the aforementioned delictual action, the revendicatory action, and a quasi-

contractual action for unjust enrichment
In holding that the strict liability characteristic of common law conversion
renders it incompatible with Article 2315, the supreme court implies that Article

2315 contemplates liability only for acts ofnegligence and intentional misconduct.
Yet, the court recognizes strict liability as an example ofnon-blameworthy conduct
which nevertheless constitutes fault under Article 2315.' In this way the court
contradicts itself, for if strict liability is a type of fault, why should the strict

liability feature of common law conversion render it incompatible with Article
2315? Because of this ambiguity, the Dual Drilling decision might be read as
suggesting that Article 2315 imposes liability only for acts of negligence and
intentional misconduct while impositions of strict liability are justified apart from
Article 2315. However, such a reading would conflict with previous judicial
interpretations of Article 2315 fault.' More importantly, such a reading would
frustrate the civilian methodology traditionally employed in defining fault under
Article 2315.
This writer submits that DualDrillingshould be understood as maintaining an
expansive concept of fault consistent with jurisprudence. The ambiguity created
in the decision should be viewed as the result of an oversimplification by the
supreme court of a technique long employed by the Louisiana courts. This
1974); Davis v. American Marine Corp., 163 So. 2d 163 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 165 So. 2d
483 (1964).
7. La. Civ. Code art. 2315 provides in part: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to
another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
8. Dual Drilling Co., 721 So. 2d at 856 (citing A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property §§350, 356.357,
in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1998)). According to Professor Yiannopoulos,
the revendicatory action is an innominate real action based on Louisiana Civil Code article 526 forthe
recognition ofone's ownership of a movable and recoveryof the movable. By virtue of Louisiana Civil
Code article 530 and the presumption which it creates that a present possessor of a corporeal movable
is the owner, both possessors and owners of movables may avail themselves of the revendicatory action.
The quasi-contractual action is based on the Civil Code rules governing the payment of a thing not due.
Using these codal provisions, the Louisiana courts have fashioned a general remedy for unjust
enrichment. The dclictual action is based on Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 and predicated on the
fault of the defendant.
9. Dual Drilling Co., 721 So. 2d at 857 (citing Louisiana Tort Law §1-2. at 3).
10. See Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assoc. Ltd., 650So. 2d 712,718 (La. 1994) (Article 2315
and the civilian concept of fault "includes more than just negligence; it extends the gamut from strict
liability to intentional torts."); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133, 137 (La. 1971) ("Fault
is not limited to moral wrongs but encompasses many acts which are merely forbidden by law."). See
also Butler v. Baber, 529 So. 2d 374 (La. 1988); Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 642 So. 2d 1243 (La. 1994).
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technique or methodology is the practice of defining Article 2315 "fault" by
analogy with other statutory provisions. In order to illustrate how the courts have
employed this technique, this article explores in limited scope the development of
Louisiana's ultrahazardous activity doctrine in which the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that the absolute obligations imposed by the vicinage articles were exemplary
of fault. Finally, this article examines the characteristics of -civil law
conversion-the Louisiana delictual counterpart to the common law tort of
conversion."

II. DUAL DRILLING
A.

Facts

In October 1990, partners Travis Volimering and Atlas Iron and Metal
Company agreed to purchase an inoperative offshore oil rig (designated "Rig 16")
for scrap from Dual Drilling Company. The rig was located at the Tidex shipyard
in Amelia, Louisiana, together with other Dual Drilling rigs and equipment.
Subsequent to the sale, Atlas engaged Southern Scrap Recycling to dismantle Rig
16. Vollmering visited the shipyard with a Southern employee to identify for him
each item that was to be dismantled. Vollmering mistakenly identified an adjacent
rig component (part of Rig 25) as part of his property and instructed the Southern
employee to dismantle it. Before the Southern employees returned to dismantle the
equipment identified by Vollmering, a Dual Drilling employee arrived at the
shipyard and marked "Do Not Cut" on all three sides of Rig 25 with fluorescent
orange spray paint. As instructed by the partnership, Southern employees began
cutting Rigs 16 and 25. A shipyard worker noticed Southern employees cutting Rig
25 and told them that it was not to be cut. Southern employees continued to cut
despite the warning. Dual Drilling thereafter filed suit against Vollmering, Atlas
and Southern for conversion of Rig 25.12 The trial court found that Southern knew
or should have known that Atlas was not the owner of the Rig 25 cement package
and held them liable for conversion."
On appeal, Southern argued that by applying common law conversion
principles, the trial court erred in holding them liable without fault." According
to Southern, since Article 2315 imposes liability only upon proof of fault,
negligence must be shown. Additionally, Southern argued that the trial court erred
in concluding that Southern knew or should have known that the Rig 25 cement
package was not part of the property sold to Atlas. On the facts of the case, the
appellate court considered Southern's argument---that common law conversion was
at odds with Article 2315-irrelevant since the record clearly demonstrated that
Southern acted negligently in causing damage to Rig 25. Nevertheless, the

11.
12.
13.
14.

DualDrillingCo., 721 So. 2d at 857 n.3.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 856.
Dual DrillingCo. v. Mills Equip. Inv., Inc., 705 So. 2d 1246,1256 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
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appellate court addressed the argument. Relying on Louisiana State Bar
Associationv. Hinrichs," the appellate court ruled that in Louisiana neither proof
nor proof of negligence was necessary to succeed in an
of conscious wrongdoing
6
action for conversion.1
B. Conversion Versus Delictual Action for Wrongful Dispossession
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs to determine whether Louisiana
law provided for a tort of conversion akin to that of the common law.'7 The court
concluded that common law conversion was unnecessary in Louisiana since
"civilian remedies amply protect personal and real rights in movable
property.... ,,t1 Furthermore, the court held that the strict liability feature of
common law conversion renders the tort incompatible with the Article 2315
requirement of fault. In consequence, the court distinguished the common law tort
of conversion from the corresponding civil law delictual action. "9According to
the court:
[Common law conversion is] not to be confused with the civil law tort of
conversion. In common law jurisdictions, conversion is an intentional
wrong giving rise to strict liability.... Prominent legal scholars agree
that tortious activity is only established upon proof of fault under La. Civ.
Code art. 2315 as opposed to the common law allowance of strict

liability.... 20

This statement implies that strict liability is incompatible with Article 2315.
However, the court states a few sentences later that strict liability nevertheless
constitutes fault under Article 2315.2' Thus, the court's message is unclear.
Notably, a subsequent statement in the opinion suggests that the court may not have
been making such a broad statement about the concept of fault: "the [strict] liability
which characterizes conversion is in direct conflict with Article 2315 of the
Louisiana Civil Code and the principle that liabilityfor wrongful dispossession

15.
16.

486So.2d 116(La. 1986).
The court stated:
The intent required for a conversion is not necessarily that of conscious wrongdoing. It is rather

an intent to exercise adominion or control over the goods which is in fact inconsistent with the
plaintiff's rights. A mistake of law or fact is no defense. Persons deal with the chattels or
exercise acts of ownership over them at their peril, and must take the risk that there is no lawful
justification for their acts.
Dual Drilling Co.. 705 So. 2d at 1257 (citingHinrichs, 486 So. 2d at 121).
17. Dual Drilling Co.. 721 So. 2d at 854.
18. Id. at 856. See supra note 8. See generally Robert L Morris, Movable Properly-Remedies
of One Out of Possession ofMovables, 37 Tul. L Rev. 843 (1963); A.N. Yiannopoulos, RealActions
in Louisiana, 25 La. L Rev. 589 (1965); AN. Yiannopoulos. Property 11350.356,357, in 2 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1999).
19. Dual Drilling. 721 So. 2d at 857.
20. Id. at 857 n.3 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
21. Id.
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Because this statement focuses principally on wrongful
rests on fault."'
dispossession liability, it does not suggest that allimpositions of strict liability are
in conflict with Article 2315. However, the court does not explain why strict
liability may not be imposed in cases of wrongful dispossession.
The supreme court relied on the commentary of Professor Yiannopoulos for
the proposition that common law conversion should not be recognized in
Professor Yiannopoulos claims that the availability of the
Louisiana.'
revendicatory action, the quasi-contractual theory of unjust enrichment, and the
fault based delictual action for damages renders common law conversion
unnecessary. He explains that the tort of conversion developed of necessity at
common law since chattels did not benefit from the protection afforded by real
actions such as the revendicatory action extant in the continental legal system.
Additionally, the conversion action was necessary at common law since the
conservative English courts were historically unwilling to allow recovery on quasicontractual theories. Professor Yiannopoulos states that acivil law system does not
require the protection of the conversion action since real actions are available and
24
quasi-contractual awards are frequently granted. Finally, Professor Yiannopoulos
states that common law conversion should not be recognized in Louisiana since
"conversion is an intentional wrong giving rise to strict liability" whereas at civil
law "the corresponding delictual action is based on the fault of the defendant."'
This statement, like that of the DualDrilling court, suggests an incompatibility
between strict liability and the Article 2315 requirement of fault. However, unlike
the supreme court, Professor Yiannopoulos does not suggest as a general rule that
"tortious activity is only established upon proof of fault." Apparently, the conflict
that Professor Yiannopoulos points out is limited to the delictual protection of
movables. He does not suggest that Article 2315 in all cases demands at minimum
proof of negligence.
DualDrillingis not the first decision to challenge the viability of common law
6
conversion in Louisiana. In Lincecum v. Smith, the plaintiff brought an action for
conversion arising from the destruction of her dog. The defendant found the dog
in his neighborhood and took possession of it. The court found that the defendant
had made minimal attempts to locate the owner before taking the dog away with
him to Baton Rouge. While in Baton Rouge the defendant brought the dog to a
veterinarian for treatment of an eye infection. The veterinarian informed the
defendant that the dog was almost blind and that a treatment costing over $200

22. d. (emphasis added).
23. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property §357. at 691, in2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed.
1991 & Supp. 1999); AN. Yiannopoulos. Work ofthe Appellate Courts-1975-1976, 37 La. L Rev.
317, 330 (1976); A.N. Yiannopoulos, RealActions in Louisiana,25 La. L Rev. 589.692, 694 (1965).
24. But see Lusco v. McNeese, 86 So. 2d 226,228 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1956) (Tate J.holding that
real actions are not applicable to movables).
25. A.N. Yiannopoulos. Property §357, at 691, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991
& Supp. 1999).
26. 287 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 290 So. 2d 904 (La. 1974).
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would not likely cure the dog. On the advise of the veterinarian, the defendant
ordered the dog put to sleep.
Finding that he did all that was expected of him under the circumstances, the
trial court held that the defendant did not act negligently in putting the dog to sleep.
Accordingly, the court ruled that it was not the fault of the defendant that the
plaintiff suffered her loss. In reversing the trial court, the third circuit noted that
the "intent required [to satisfy the tort ofconversion] is not necessarily a matter of
conscious wrongdoing. It is rather an intent to exercise a dominion... over the
goods which is infactinconsistent with the plaintiff's rights."" Furthermore, the
appellate court noted that under the circumstances the defendant had acted
negligently in not making greater efforts to locate the owner of what was obviously
a very expensive dog before putting it to sleep.
The Louisiana Supreme Court refused writs stating, "[t]he result is correct.
See Civil Code Article 2315." In a concurring statement Justice Barham stated:
"Trover and conversion are common law remedies. The civil law of Louisiana
does not follow the common law and especially does not follow these common law
concepts. Recovery is had for all damage caused by the fault of another under
Civil Code Article 2315."" As in Dual Drilling the court's statement is
ambiguous. Does the above statement simply suggest that Article 2315 can not
impose strict liabilityfor theprotectionofmovables or does the statement suggest
a fundamental incompatibility between the Article 2315 requirement of fault and
strict liability? It is submitted that the former is the proper view for reasons
discussed below.
I.

DEmNo FAULT-AND WHAT DEFiNING MEANS

As defined in Black's Law Dictionary, fault entails some measure of
imprudence on the part of an actor resulting from inattention, incapacity or
perversity. Using this definition, if tort liability were imposed only for damage
caused by the fault of another then liability would be imposed only when a
tortfeasor had acted negligently or acted with an intent to cause damage. In a
similar manner Article 2315 obliges persons who are at fault in causing damage to
repair it.3' However, the Louisiana courts have historically incorporated a broader
definition of fault than that described above.3" Indeed, Louisiana's jurisprudence
informs that strict liability is a type of fault." Hence, the Louisiana application of
fault in Article 2315 may be described simply as a legal determinationof whether
27. Uncecum, 287 So. 2d at 628 (citing William L Prosser. Handbook of the Law of Torts §83-4
(3d ed. 1964)) (emphasis added).
28. Lincecum v. Smith, 290 So. 2d 904 (La. 1974).
29. Id.
30. Black's Law Dictionary 608 (6th ed. 1990).
31. See supra note 7.
32. See authorities cited supra note 10 and text accompanying note 48.
33. Loescherv. Parr,324 So. 2d441.446 (La. 1975) (TateJ. classified thestrict liability imposed
by La. Civ. Code art. 2317 as a type of fault called "legal fault").
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or not one will be made to repair damage caused by his actions-regardless of
whether the tortfeasor's damage causing conduct may be considered imprudent.
There are formidable arguments against equating strict liability with Article
2315 fault. Doing so might allow for unrestrained judicial expansion of"faultless"
torts and strict liability under Article 2315. In fact, the supreme court in Langlois
v. Allied Chemical Corp.34andLoescher v. Parr" took advantage of the flexibility
that an expansive view of fault allows in developing Louisiana's products liability
law and the state's ultrahazardous activity doctrine. Furthermore, there are
formidable arguments against ever imposing strict liability. The most compelling
is that imposing liability in the absence of blameworthiness (that is, liability in the
absence of negligence or intentional wrongdoing) provides no beneficial deterring
effect. As Professor Andr6 Tunc points out, the deterrent effect of tort law is not
furthered if liability is imposed in situations where the defendant acts as a
reasonable man but nevertheless must answer for the damage he caused.' Professor
Stig Jorgensen notes that the "idea of prevention or deterrence is the functional.
.. counterpart of the idea of fault.' "37 Yet another reason for not imposing liability
for non-blameworthy acts is to prevent tort law from becoming social insurance.
According to Professor Wex Malone, "[themore often courts elect to depart from
the fault concept, the more sharply looms the obvious similarity between the
damage claim and other forms of social insurance. 38
Though these commentators present a strong case against the imposition of
strict liability, their comments are more properly addressed to the legislature rather
than the courts. This is so because the Louisiana courts have not imposed strict
liability based on Article 2315 alone with the exception of the common law torts
of trespass to chattel and conversion.39 When strict liability has been imposed, it
is justified on the basis of statutory provisions apart from Article 2315, such as
Articles 667, .2318, and 2322 as they existed prior to the 1996 tort reform
legislation.' Furthermore, defining Article 2315 merely as a source of tort
34. 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971).
35. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
36. Andrd Tunc, Fault: A Common Namefor Different Misdeeds, 49 Tul. L Rev. 279. 280-83
(1975).
37. Stig Jorgensen. Liability and Fault, 49 Tul. L Rev. 329. 332 (1975). Professor Jorgensen
concludes that strict liability should be considered atype of fault:
[Tlhe old system offault based on the method ofbalancing ofinterests, characteristic ofthe
doctrine ofwrongfulness. and the principles ofthe bonuspaterfamilias are antiquated with
regard to their theoretical foundations and likewise are unable to answer the requirements
of the modem community. Instead, the analysis of fault must be regarded as a special
application of the general principles on the sources of law.
Id. at 335.
38. Wex S.Malone, Ruminations on Liabilityfor the Acts ofThings. 42 La. L. Rev. 979, 988
(1982) (Professor Malone appears to be equating fault with blameworthiness).
39. But see Kent v. Gulf States Util. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982) (Some commentators have
interpreted this decision as suggesting that the ultrahazardous duty doctrine and its imposition of
absolute liability fall under Article 2315 alone and not by analogy to other code articles.)
40. La. Civ. Code art. 667 (1870) provided: "Although a proprietor may do with his estate
whateverhe pleases, still he can not make any work on it,which may deprive his neighborof the liberty
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responsibility for acts of negligence and intentional wrongdoing would be unwise

since itoverlooks the role of Article 2315 as a veritable porthole through which all
tort responsibility flows by analogy with other articles.
Historically, Louisiana courts have defined what constitutes fault underArticle
2315 by analogy with other code articles. For example, reading Article 2316 in
parimateriawith Article 2315 informs that fault includes "negligence, imprudence
or... want of skill.'' Fault also includes strict liability, for according to the
supreme court inLoescher,Article 2317, though not requiring proof of negligence,
exemplifies fault. Indeed, Loescher held that all of the articles following Article
of enjoying his own. or which may be the cause of any damage to him."
La. Civ. Code art. 2318 (1870) provided in part: "he father,or after his decease, the mother, are
responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children, residing with them,
or placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons."
La. Civ. Code art. 2322 (1870) provided: "he owner of a building is answerable for the damage
occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice in its
original construction."
Following La. Acts 1996. 1st Ex. Sess., No. I and La. Acts 1996, Ex. Sess., No. 3 [hereinafter
1996 tort reform legislation] in which Articles 660,667,2321.2322, 2323, and 2324(B) and (C) were
amended and Article 2317.1 enacted, the above articles (with the exception of Article 2318) were
modified to require proof of negligence.
La. Civ. Code art. 667 provides in part:
Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he can not make any
work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty ofenjoying his own, or which may
be the cause of any damage to him. However, if the work he makes on his estate deprives
his neighbor ofenjoyment or causes damage to him, he is answerable for damages only
upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known
that his works would cause damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the
exercise of reasonable care, and that hefailed to exercise such reasonable care.
(emphasis added).
La. Civ. Code art. 2318 provides in part:
The father and the mother and, after the decease of either, the surviving parent, am

responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children, residing
with them, or placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them recourse
against those persons.
(emphasis added).
La. Civ. Code art. 2322 provides in part:
The owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is
caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice or defect in its original
construction. However, he is answerable for damages only upon a showing that he knew
or,inthe exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the vice or defect which
caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of
reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care.
(emphasis added).
For a discussion of what remains of strict and absolute liability following the enactment of the
1996 tort reform legislation see Louisiana Tort Law §§ 1-8. 1-9; Frank L Maraist & Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., Burying Caesar: Civil Justice Reform and the Changing'Face of Louisiana Tort Law,
71 Tul. L Rev. 339 (1996).
41. Langlois v. Allied Cham. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133,136 (La. 1971). Ia.Civ. Code art. 2316
provides: "Every person is responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act, but by his
negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill."
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2315 in Chapter 2, Title 5ofBook 3serve as "amplifications as to what constitutes
'fault'."' 42 Yet, nowhere is the practice of defining fault by analogy with other
articles more exemplary than in the development of Louisiana's ultrahazardous
activity doctrine. The dynamic nature of Article 2315 allowed the courts to
incorporate the absolute obligations imposed by Articles 667-669 (commonly
referred to as the vicinage articles) into tort law reasoning that these articles serve
as examples of fault. Indeed, the development of this tort doctrine beyond its
property law roots might not have been possible had Article 2315 and its concept
of fault been limited to mere negligence and intentional wrongdoing.
IV.

THE ULTRAHAZARDOUS AcnvrrY DocTRINE AND ARTICLE 2315

The development of the ultrahazardous activity doctrine in Louisiana has its
roots in the vicinage articles. These provisions establish what might be considered
predial servitudes limiting the scope and extent of the right of ownership in
immovable property. 3 In particular, Article 667 imposes upon a proprietor an
obligation to not make any work on his land which might deprive his neighbor of
the liberty of enjoying his own land or causing him any damage. By 1964 it was
well settled that this obligation imposed strict liability and that damages might be
as to
awarded pursuant to that article.44 However, a question existed at the time
4
whether the Article 667 action was an action ex contractu or ex delicto. 1
The fourth circuit in Gulf Insurance Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp." faced this question in determining whether the Article 667 action was
subject to a ten or a one year liberative prescription period. While noting that some
earlier cases had recognized the Article 667 action as quasi-contractual in nature,
the court classified the action as one in tort relying on the commentary ofProfessor
Ferdinand Stone, in particular, that Article 667 exemplifies fault under Article
2315.4 According to Professor Stone, Article 2315 is broad enough to include
intentional wrongdoing, negligence, strict and vicarious liability. Furthermore,
"fault" as the term is used in Article 2315 is a dynamic concept:
[F]ault is the mirror of our times: what we, people of Louisiana, decide
fault to be, that is fault. As such, fault is a fluid term definable only with
respect to its surroundings and thus, with the concept of fault, we can

42. Loescher v. Parr, 24 So. 2d 441,445 (La. 1975).
43. For a discussion of the legal nature of the vicinage articles see Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v.
Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (La. 1919); Ferdinand Fairfax Stone, Ton Doctrine in
Louisiana: The Obligations ofNeighborhood,40 Tul.L Rev. 701 (1966); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Civil
Responsibilityin the Frameworkof Vicinage: Arts. 667-69and2315ofthe CivilCode,48 Tul. L Rev.
195 (1974).

44. See Gulf Ins. Co. v.Employers
1964).
45. Idat 126-27.
46.

Uab. Assurance Corp., 170 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 4th Cir.

170 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).

at127.
47. Id.
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incorporate into our tort law a new situation without changing our
definition of fault....
Stone points to Articles 667, 2318, and 2322 as examples oflegislative impositions
of liability without negligence. Though imposing liability for what is perhaps nonblameworthy conduct, these articles nevertheless exemplify Article 2315 fault.
Stone classifies this non-negligent type of fault as "legal fault." 49 Some consider
liability founded upon this theory as "liability without fault." 5°
According to Stone, whether one is at fault may be answered according to a
definite method. 5' First, the courts should refer to the Louisiana Civil Code and its
provisions regarding the responsibility of certain persons or those engaged in
certain types of activity in search of illustrations of fault.5 2 The courts must refer
to the state constitution and other acts of the legislature, as well as the multitude of
municipal ordinances and regulations, in search of standards of conduct similarly
illustrative of fault." Having exhausted positive law, the unprovided-for-case must
be decided upon natural law, reason and received usages.' This concept of fault
and the process by which the courts of Louisiana may elucidate it, gained
acceptance by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Langlois v. Allied ChemicalCorp.
wherein the court employed this methodology holding that the vicinage
articles--though imposing liability without negligence-were illustrative of Article
2315 fault."5
In Langlois, the plaintiff, Emanuel Langlois, was a fireman employed by the
Baton Rouge Fire Department who responded to an emergency at the Delta
Southern Tank facility. During the five minute interval in which the firemen
(including plaintiff) remained at Delta, they encountered a noxious gas in the form
of a haze or fog coming from an unknown source. In fact, the gas had escaped
from the bordering Allied Chemical Corporation plant when a pipe carrying gas
from a reactor ruptured. As a result of the exposure, the plaintiff sustained injuries.

48. Ferdinand F. Stone, Louisiana Tort Doctrine §60, at 84 in 12 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1977).
49. Ferdinand P. Stone, Tort Doctrine In Louisiana: The Concept ofFault, 27 Tul. L Rev. 1,
19 (1952). See also Ferdinand F. Stone, Touchstones ofTortLiability, 2Stan. L Rev. 259,283 (1950).
50. See authorities cited supra note 49.
51. Ferdinand P. Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Materialsfor the Decision ofa Case,
17 Tul. L Rev. 159. 209-15 (1942).
52. Id. at 209.
53. Id. at 212.
54. Id. at 214. For a particular application of the Stone methodology wherein a received usage
served as an example of what constituted fault, see Infra note 59.
55. In Langlois, ofall the vicinage articles, La. Civ. Code art. 669 (1870) was of greatest utility
to the court; it provided:
If the works or materials for any manufactory or other operation, cause an inconvenience to
those in the same or in the neighboring houses, by diffusing smoke or nauseous smell, and
there be no servitude established by which they are regulated, their sufferance must be
determined by the rules of the police, orthe customs of the place.
Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133, 137 (La. 1971).
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Affirming plaintiff's recovery, the supreme court held that Article 2315
imposed liability for damage caused by ultrahazardous activities-proof of
negligence was not required. Employing the method advocated by Professor Stone
to define fault, Justice Barham stated that "our lawmakers have provided us with
numerous standards of fault in the Civil Code, in statutory law, and in ordinances.
Fault is not limited to moral wrongs but encompasses many acts which are merely
forbidden by law."56 Justice Barham further remarked that "[ t ] he activities of man
for which he may be liable without acting negligently are to be determined after a
study of the law and customs.. . ."-" Finding an applicable standard of conduct in
the vicinage articles, albeit a standard of absolute obligation, the court held that
liability for dangerous and hazardous activities flows from Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315 by analogy with those articles."
In this way, Louisiana's
ultrahazardous activity doctrine not only came into being as a delictual theory but
also became synonymous with fault.' 9
V.

UNIFARY SOURCE OF DELICTUAL RESPONSWIBnY INARTICLE 2315

One might ask why the Langlois court thought it necessary that all delictual
actions be ultimately traceable to a single source in Article 2315. Why not
56. Langlois, 249 So. 2d at 137.
57. Id. at 140. in fact, Justice Barham indicated exactly how to proceed:
[l]n the decision of a case in tort or delict in Louisiana, the court first goes to that
fountainhead ofresponsibility, Articles 2315 and 2316, and in applying those articles it goes
to many other articles in our Code as well as statutes and other laws ... which courts may
apply per se, impliedly or by analogy.
Id. at 137.
58. Id. at 139.
59. The Stone methodology has also been applied by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The case of Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Service of Texas. 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969) involved a
wrongful death claim in admiralty. The court faced the question of whether Article 2315 (at the time
Louisiana's death statute) would allow fordamages based on a finding that defendant's sea goingvessel
was unseaworthy-a determination based on the condition of the vessel exclusive of any act oromission
on the part of defendant. Defendant argued that Article 2315 required a showing of personal
negligence. According to the court, it is the breach ofa duty which defines fault, and that duty may be
an absolute obligation thereby imposing strict liability on the breaching party. Recognizing that the
Louisiana Civil Code did not impose a duty to prevent against unseaworthiness, the court reasoned that
the maritime standard can be considered a received usage in Louisiana under Article 21 (now La. Civ.
Code art. 4). It followed that the breach of the duty to ensure seaworthiness was an example of Article
2315 fault. Judge Wisdom stated: "(W]e agree, too, with the district court's view that because of
Louisiana's commitment to civil law, Louisiana would be the last jurisdiction to put a narrow
interpretation of fault that would rule out as an applicable standard the maritime principle of
seaworthiness." ld. at 1028.
Noting that liability for unseaworthiness equates to strict liability and that the Louisiana Civil Code
does not address liability for damages resulting from the unseaworthiness of a vessel, query if Grigsby
could be justified independent of Articles 2315 and 2315.2 as it would have to be were those articles
interpreted as requiring proof of negligence or intentional wrongdoing. Might Louisiana Civil Code
article 4serve as an independent source of tort responsibility? If it were, the strict liability common law
torts (trespass and conversion) might be justified as prevailing usages and maintain an existence
separate and apart from Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.
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recognize other sources of tort responsibility independent of Article 2315 such as
the vicinage articles? At the time of the Langlois decision, the vicinage articles
collectively did not provide for damages.' In particular, Article 669, the provision
of greatest application in Langlois, did not. 6= Prior to Langlois some courts did
award damages under these articles exclusive of any connection with Article 2315.
Many of these decisions characterized the vicinage articles, in particular Article
667, as creating a quasi-contractual action and awarded damages accordingly. Still
others classified it as a delictual action.' In order to theoretically justify damages
the vicinage articles had to be connected with Article 2315 which itself provided
for damages upon a showing of fault. The supreme court in Langlois made this
connection by employing the Stone methodology. A second reason for making a
connection between the vicinage articles and Article 2315 was to classify these
actions as ex delicto for procedural reasons, in particular, to determine the
applicable liberative prescription period.6 3 One benefit of attributing all delictual
actions to Article 2315 was to provide for the heritability of these actions. Until
1986, Article 2315 provided for the heritability of delictual actions for injuries
caused by offenses and quasi-offenses." Clearly, this applied to actions arising
from any of the articles within Chapter 2 "Of Offenses and Quasi Offenses," but
what about the heritability of delictual actions arising from articles outside that
chapter? Would Article 2315 apply to these as well? Classifying delictual actions
arising from whatever source as an Article 2315 action avoided any potential
problem.
VI.

CivILiAN METHODOLOGY APPUED

The DualDrillingcourt might have avoided ambiguity had it employed the
Stone method as the supreme court did in Langlois. In doing so the court might
have clarified what it meant by its statement: "tortious activity is only established
upon proof of fault

. . .

as opposed to the common law allowance of strict

liability."65 The court might have indicated that a survey of the Louisiana Civil
Code reveals no express imposition of strict liability for the protection ofmovables;
therefore, negligence is the proper standard to be applied in determining fault.
For the sake of clarification, let us employ the Stone method in determining if
the commission of what would be considered conversion at common law is an
example of fault in Louisiana. The codal provisions governing movables are found
in Title II of Book I, namely Chapters I through 4. We find therein the rules of
accession of movables and the transfer of ownership of movables. Article 516
60. See supra notes 40 and 55.
61. See supra note 55.
62. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employers Uab. Assurance Corp., 170 So. 2d 125,127-28 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964).
63. Id.
64. La. Civ. Code. art 2315.1 now provides for the heritability of delictual actions arising from
an offense or quasi offense as a survival action.
65. Dual Drilling Co., 721 So.2d at 857 n.3.
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provides that "[olne who uses a movable of another, without his knowledge, for the
making of a new thing may be liable for the payment of damages." In Dual
Drilling,defendants did not make a new thing but instead caused damage to a
thing. Arguably this provision and all of the provisions governing accession in
relation to movables are inapplicable since they primarily regulate the transfer of
ownership and ultimately seek to prevent unjust enrichment. Article 526 provides
in part that "the owner of a thing is entitled to recover it from anyone who possess
or detains it without right...." This article presumes not only that the owner is not
in possession but that the owner would be made whole by the return of the thing.
Such was not the case in DualDrilling. Similarly, the provisions relating to lost

or stolen things (Articles 521, 524) contemplate a situation in which the rightful
owner is out of possession, and the return of the thing will repair his damage.
Ultimately, we may conclude that no statute expressly creates an absolute duty to

guard against harming another's ownership or possessory interest in a movable."
Finally, resorting to Article 4 we inquire into justice, reason, and'prevailing
usage. Are we willing to say that common law conversion is a prevailing usage in

Louisiana? Even so, does justice require us to adopt such a strict standard,
indifferent to any error or reasonable mistake? Perhaps not, for as the supreme

court and Professor Yiannopoulos agree, movables are adequately protected
without imposing strict liability.'

Since the Louisiana Civil Code does not impose

a greater standard of care than that generally required by Article 2315-namely,
negligence as illustrated by analogy with Article 2316--the supreme court might
have reached the same result but instead by reasoning that common law conversion
is not viable in Louisiana since it imposes a higher standard of conduct than that

required by the codal scheme.
VII.

LOUISIANA'S DEUCTUAL COUNTERPART TO COMMON LAW CONVERSION

A. Two Forms of Conversion
The Dual Drilling court cites with approval earlier Louisiana decisions
describing the specific conduct that would result in a conversion, suggesting that
this conduct is similarly descriptive of the corresponding Article 2315 delictual
action." The cited opinions each describe the characteristics of the common law
66. The Dual Drillingcourt stated that the existence of a conversion action may be inferred from
these articles. However, the court did not utilizethese articles todetermine what constitutes fault when
aperson destroys another's movable property. Dual Drilling Co., 721 So. 2d at 856 n.3.
67.

See supra notes 8 and 23 and text accompanying notes 23-25.

68.

The Dual Drilling court stated:

A conversion is committed when any of the following occurs: 1) possession is acquired in
an unauthorized manner; 2) the chattel is removed from one place to another with the intent
to exercise control over it; 3) possession of the chattel is transferred without authority; 4)
possession withheld from the owner or possessor; 5) the chattel is altered or destroyed; 6)
the chattel is used improperly; or 7) ownership is asserted over the chattel.
Dual Drilling Co.. 721 So. 2d at 857 (citing Importsales Inc. v. Lindeman, 92 So. 2d 574 (La. 1957);
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Hinrichs, 486 So. 2d 116 (La. 1986): and Louisiana Tort Law §1-2. at 3).
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tort. Thus, the practical effect of Dual Drillingon conversion actions appears to
be limited to altering only one aspect of common law conversion-the measure of
intent. Previously a plaintiff had only to show that: 1) he owned the movable in
question or had a possessory interest in it; 2) the defendant intended to manipulate
the movable in the manner in which he did; and 3) the manipulation was in fact
contrary to the plaintiff's ownership or possessory interest in the movable.
Arguably, what must now be shown to recover in an action for conversion is that
the defendant intentionally exercised dominion over a movable in a manner
knowingly adverse to another's property interest. Arguably, the common law
intentional tort of trespass will be similarly impacted by this decision since it shares
common law conversion's strict liability feature. Yet, casting the change in terms
of a minimum requirement of proof offault (the court appears to mean a minimum
requirement of negligence), the court in effect recognizes two forms of civil law
conversion. One form is the aforementioned intentional tort. The second is a
negligence-based tort in which movable property is damaged as a result of an
unreasonable risk of harm created by the defendant. With two forms of conversion,
one intentional another negligent, the allocation of fault in a comparative fault
analysis will differ depending on which is proved." Similarly, whether or not
solidary liability is imposed will also depend to some extent on which tort is
proved. 70
B.

Negligent Conversion

The delictual action based on negligence should require proof of negligence
no different than that previously required in Louisiana. The courts may be
expected to proceed by a duty/risk analysis in deciding whether the defendant
should respond for the damage caused by his negligence.7 ' It is interesting to note
that the common law tort of conversion would not succeed on a showing of
negligence alone.72 Clearly, DualDrillingallows for damages if a defendant acts
negligently since fault undisputedly contemplates negligence.
C.

IntentionalConversionand the Caudle MeasureofIntent

Regarding Louisiana's intentional tort of conversion, it is not clear what
measure of intent will be required. In order for the imposition of strict liability to
be avoided, the requisite intent must be more than the mere volition to control

69. La. Civ. Code art. 2323 provides in part: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraphs A
and B, ifa person suffers injury, death, or loss as aresult partly of his own negligence and partly as a
result of the fault of an intentional tortfeasor, his claim for recovery ofdamages shall not be reduced."
70. La. Civ. Code art. 2324 provides in part: "He who conspires with another person to commit
an intentional tort or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by
such an act."
71. See Dixie Drive ItYourself System of New Orleans v. American Beverage Co., 137 So. 2d
298 (La. 1962); Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972).
72. Restatement (Second) of Torts §224 (1965).
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movable property. The DualDrillingcourt rejected this measure of intent as nonblameworthy, suggesting that a more focused intent is necessary-perhaps an intent
directed at doing harm to another's possessory or ownership interest in amovable."
Clearly, ifa defendant desires to permanently deny an owner the use of his property
without permission or legal right, such would be considered a conversion in
Louisiana. The intent is blameworthy in that it is a desire to injure the owner's
property interest. 4 A less injurious intent is illustrated by the following example:
The defendant desires to use a movable which he knows does not belong to him.
The defendant accidentally damages the movable. The defendant did not desire the
harmful consequences of his act but rather merely intended to use the movable
without the owner's consent. Might the resulting damages be more properly
considered the result of negligence? The Louisiana Supreme Court held to the
contrary when it addressed this issue in the context of a battery claim in Caudlev.
Betts."
In Caudle, the court faced the question of whether an electrical shock
administered to a worker by his employer's chief executive officer as a practical
joke constituted an intentional tort.7' The lower courts held that no intentional tort
had been committed since the resulting injury was not intended nor reasonably
foreseeable. The supreme court reversed, stating that the intention need not be
malicious nor need it be an intention to inflict actual damage." All that is
necessary is that the actor intend to inflict either a harmful or offensive contact
without the other's consent. The fact that unforeseeable injury occurred is
irrelevant; the defendant must respond in damages for them.
If we apply the Caudleconcept of intent to conversion, the minimum measure
of intent necessary to establish conversion in Louisiana is not so blameworthy as
desiring to damage another's movable, but rather an intent to act contrary to
another's ownership or possessory interest. Thus, in the above example of our
defendant who did not desire to harm the movable but nevertheless acted without
the owner's consent, the act is an intentional conversion since the defendant acted
73. The requirement that the intent element of an intentional tort constitute more than merely the
intent to do the act is not a new concept in Louisiana. See Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La.
1981) wherein the court, responding to plaintiff's proposition that intentional acts should be equated
with voluntary acts, stated:
The meaning of 'intent' is that a person who acts either (I)consciously desires the physical
result of his acts, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or (2)
knows that the result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire
may be as tothat result. Thus, intent has reference to the consequences of an act rather than
to the act itself.
(citations omitted).

74. An intent desiring such consequences may be equated with intent to commit the crimes of
theft and unauthorized use of a movable. See La. R.S. 14:67 (1999) and La. R.S. 14:68 (1999).
75. 512 So. 2d 389 (La. 1987).
76. Id. at 389. During a Christmas party defendant played a practical joke on plaintiff by
shocking him with a charged automobile condenser. The shock delivered was slight, however, in the
months following the incident, plaintiff experienced headaches and fainting spells. Surgery severing
the occipital nerve was necessary to alleviate the headaches and fainting spells.

77.

id.at391.
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knowingly adverse to the owner's property interest. In fact, the holding of Dual
Drillingsupports this conclusion. In DualDrilling,the court affirmed the trial
court's finding that Southern knew or should have known that Rig 25 was not part
of the sale. The supreme court affirmed the imposition of solidary liability but
remanded the case for an allocation of fault between the defendants since the trial
7
court, in applying the principles of strict liability, did not allocate fault. " Clearly,
defendant's employees did not intend the harm that resulted from their acts.
Nevertheless, the defendant's employees' conduct, coupled with their knowledge
(or constructive knowledge) that their acts were contrary to another's ownership
interest, constituted an intentional tort. Thus, the degree of intent held sufficient
in Dual Drilling to impose solidary liability comports with that level of intent
described in Caudlev. Betts.
By imposing the Caudle standard of intent as opposed to strict liability, the
claim of reasonable mistake as to ownership serves as a defense to intentional
conversion. Claims of reasonable mistake might also serve as a defense to
conversion actions based on negligence. Consider a situation in which an actor is
reasonably mistaken in believing another's property is his own and destroys it.
Having exercised reasonable care, the court should conclude that the actor was not
negligent. Furthermore, believing within reason that the movable was his, the actor
lacks the Caudlestandard of intent. In other words, the actor intended neither to
injure the plaintiff's possessory or ownership interest nor even to act contraryto
the plaintiff's interests. Having destroyed the movable, the actor can no longer
return the movable as plaintiff would demand in a revendicatory action. The quasicontractual action for unjust enrichment is equally unavailing since the actor has
not been enriched by the movable's destruction. In this situation it can be said that
the owner or possessor's interest in his movable is not completely protected. In
contrast, a common law conversion action would have been successful in this case.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Despite the potential problems created by Dual Drilling, the supreme court
should be applauded for several reasons. Their decision reflects a desire to "clean
up" the delictual law of movables, a problem addressed by one Louisiana Supreme

Court decision and several commentators.79 The decision might also represent the
court's acknowledgment of the legislative will so loudly expressed in the 1996 tort
reform legislation that strict liability shall be imposed only in very limited

situations.'

Unfortunately, the court inadequately expressed its ruling. Had it

explicated the civilian method advocated by Professor Stone and employed in
Langlois, the court might have reached the same result while avoiding ambiguity.
78.

Dual Drilling Co., 721 So. 2d at 859.

79.

See iUncecum v. Smith, 290 So. 2d 904 (La. 1974); Robert L Morris, Note, Movable

Property-Remedies of One Out of Possession of Movables, 37 Tul. L Rev. 843 (1963); A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Real Actions in Louisiana, 25 La. L Rev. 589 (1965); A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property
§359, at 695. in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1999).
80. See La. Civ. Code art. 2: "Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will."
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One of the benefits of our Civil Code has been its adaptability to new and
unforeseen situations. If Dual Drilling is read as limiting the concept of fault
embodied in Article 2315, Louisiana suffers a loss of adaptability in the area of tort
law. DualDrillingshould be read as a statement about conversion, not one altering
the civilian concept of fault.
Mark Fernandez

